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A number of concepts are included in the term “consciousness”. We choose to concentrate here 
on phenomenal consciousness, the process through which we are able to experience aspects of 
our environment or of our physical state. We probably share this aspect of consciousness with 
many animals which, like us, feel pain or pleasure and experience colours, sounds, flavours, 
etc. Since phenomenal consciousness is a feature of some living species, we should be able to 
account for it in terms of natural selection. Does it have an adaptive function, or is it an 
epiphenomenon ? We shall give arguments to reject the second alternative. We propose that 
phenomenal properties of consciousness are involved in a labelling process that allows us to 
discriminate and to evaluate mental representations. We also discuss to what extent 
consciousness as such has been selected for this labelling function. 
Le terme de "conscience" recouvre plusieurs concepts. Nous parlons ici de conscience 
phénoménale, cet ensemble de processus par lesquels nous avons une expérience de certains 
aspects de notre environnement et de notre état physiologique. Nous partageons probablement 
cet aspect de la conscience avec de nombreuses espèces animales qui, comme nous, ressentent 
de la douleur et du plaisir, et font l’expérience des couleurs, des sons, des odeurs, etc. Comme 
la conscience phénoménale est une caractéristique de beaucoup d’espèces vivantes, nous 
devons l’expliquer en invoquant la sélection naturelle. A-t-elle une fonction adaptative, ou est-
elle un simple épiphénomène ? Nous donnons des arguments en faveur de la première option. 
Nous suggérons le fait que les propriétés phénoménales de la conscience sont impliquées dans 
un processus d’étiquetage qui nous permet de discriminer et d’évaluer les représentations 
mentales. Nous discutons ensuite l’hypothèse selon laquelle la conscience en tant que telle 
aurait été sélectionnée pour cette fonction d’étiquetage.  
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1. Introduction 
The term “consciousness” is merely a label for many separate phenomena. Whatever 
consciousness is, it is something that, far from being an undifferentiated stream of inner 
events, is instead a composite phenomenon which corresponds to the activity of 
functionally differentiated modular systems. We need to distinguish here phenomenal 
consciousness from other cognitive processes, from conceptual knowledge and from 
higher-order conscious states [Block 1995]. Phenomenal consciousness refers to 
qualitative properties of experience. The vividness of pain, pleasure, redness, the taste 
of red wine are examples of qualitative experiences
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. We want to deal here with 
phenomenal consciousness for two main reasons. First, many non-human species may 
have qualitative experience (if we think of pain). We do not need to grant them other 
aspects of consciousness [Griffin 1981], just the ability to experience smell, colour or 
pleasure, even if their experience is qualitatively different from ours. An obvious 
question then arises : when, and why, did qualitative experience arise in phylogenetic 
history ? Our second motivation for considering phenomenal consciousness comes from 
the fact that its very existence, and the biological adaptive function it fulfils, remain 
highly mysterious. Is it a mere epiphenomenon, or worse : a non-scientific object, or 
does it play a precise, essential, biological role ? 
 In our view, in order for the concept of consciousness to be of scientific interest, one 
has to show that it is a natural kind, i.e. a phenomenon which is useful and convenient to 
isolate as explanandum for a more advanced scientific theory.  In this presentation, we 
take the existence of phenomenal consciousness as granted and we attempt to make this 
existence compatible with evolutionary principles. We shall study first what properties 
characterise qualitative experience, before looking for a possible adaptive function.  
 We shall first consider the possibility that phenomenal consciousness is a mere 
fortuitous epiphenomenon, and that complex cognitive behaviour can take place in its 
absence. However we will reject this possibility. We will consider a possible account for 
phenomenal consciousness : it will be presented as a way to label experiences and 
mental states. Labelling is an essential feature of cognitive processing, though the most 
obvious way of labelling information, as used in computers, is not plausible in a neural 
implementation. Labelling through synchronous binding, and its qualitative correlate, 
will be presented as a solution which evolved to cope with environmental and 
behavioural complexity. Lastly, we will observe that this account, expressed first in 
terms of physical neural states, is insufficient to predict characteristic aspects of 
phenomenal consciousness. We will suggest that the ability to have experience is part of 
our phenotype and was retained as such by natural selection. 
2. Properties and role of phenomenal consciousness 
2.1 Is conscious experience nothing but an evolutionary epiphenomenon ? 
What use is the ability to experience mental states or events in the outer world ? Most of 
the complex processes going on in our body are achieved without involving any 
conscious component. We are not conscious of our immune system, we do not feel each 
contraction of our stomach, we are not aware of maintaining our equilibrium at each 
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moment. Many of our cognitive processes are performed without us being aware of 
them. We are even unable to monitor such processes. The way we analyse a visual 
scene, the way we recognise words in a complex acoustic signal, the way we adapt our 
walk on an uneven ground are good examples of such processes. In Fodor's terms 
[Fodor 1983], these processes are achieved by domain specific modules which are 
characterised by their encapsulation and their relative inaccessibility. Only the output, in 
the case of sensory modules, is experienced by the living being. Such unconscious 
processes may be quite complex, they may be context sensitive (for instance priming 
may affect word recognition) even if, according to Fodor, modules are encapsulated and 
thus receive little influence from other processes. If we think of complex unconscious 
tasks like shape and object recognition, we may wonder why cognition involves 
consciousness at all. Why are we sentient beings, why are we not unconscious like 
robots ? From a Darwinian perspective, this is a crucial question : what is the adaptive 
value of consciousness, and if consciousness has no such value, why do we happen to be 
conscious ? 
 This question is even more vital from the functionalist perspective. Functionalism 
considers that what is relevant in cognition is the causal network of mental states which 
is involved in cognitive computations. Consciousness plays no role within these 
computations.  
 The role of consciousness is so obscure that many authors doubt it, considering 
phenomenal consciousness as an epiphenomenon. Epiphenomena are known in 
evolutionary biology. Features which were not selected for, but result from the selection 
of other characteristics, are evolutionary epiphenomena. The most often mentioned 
example is the human chin, which appeared as a consequence of face and jaw reduction. 
The chin is not an organ shaped by evolution in the first place. Similarly, if 
consciousness is considered as a mere property accompanying some neural mechanisms, 
it is nothing more than a fortuitous by-product of brain evolution. Any evolutionary 
epiphenomenon has two basic properties : it is fortuitous and neutral. It could have been 
different or non-existent, and it has no effect on the survival of individuals. Is 
consciousness such a fortuitous, neutral feature ? In our view, the fact that phenomenal 
consciousness is systematically associated to sensory input analysis indicates that it is 
not incidental. 
 Phenomenal consciousness may be considered as an epiphenomenon in another 
sense. It is sometimes said to be an emergent feature of complex functional 
organisations. This concept of consciousness emerging from complexity is however not 
operational. It does not explain why every brain region does not equally contribute to 
consciousness [Edelman 1989]. It does not explain either why brain damage may alter 
phenomenal experience selectively. 
 A very serious claim is that phenomenal consciousness is systematically associated 
to a given physical neural state [Edelman 1989 ; Damasio 1989 ; Crick & Koch 1990] : 
Our basic hypothesis at the neural level is that it is useful to think of consciousness as 
being correlated with a special type of activity of perhaps a subset of neurones in the 
cortical system. Consciousness can undoubtedly take different forms, depending on 
which parts of the cortex are involved, but we hypothesize that there is one basic 
mechanism (or a few) underlying them all [Crick & Koch 1990, p. 266]. 
 These authors consider consciousness as an authentic biological feature, but nothing 
prevents us from putting forward such a hypothesis to depict consciousness again as an 
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epiphenomenon : what was retained by selection would not be consciousness itself, but 
the underlying neural mechanism. In this kind of description, consciousness plays no 
causal role by itself in cognitive activity. It is not supposed to be a mere fortuitous side-
effect, it is the mental correlate, experienced from a personal point of view [Nagel 
1974], of a special kind of brain activity. 
 Our claim about the modular properties of qualitative experience will allow us to 
argue against epiphenomenon hypotheses and to put forward a possible role for 
phenomenal consciousness in evolution. 
2.2 Modularity of qualitative experience 
The existence of conscious experience, which has recently become the object of many 
scientific and philosophical investigations, seems to deserve closer examination. The 
quality of sensory states at the phenomenal level – how things look, sound, how we feel 
them – appears to be modality-dependant. Mental disorders occurring after brain injuries 
sometimes reveal that some particular aspect of consciousness may be selectively 
impaired. For instance blind-sight patients declare to be blind in a certain area of their 
visual field. These patients suffer from brain damage, and their blind area corresponds 
precisely to the location of lesions in the primary visual cortex. However, it has been 
shown that they are still able to perform visual processing like localising simple visual 
stimuli, elementary patterns or movements [Weiskrantz 1980, 1987]. These patients are 
totally unaware of their residual visual capacity. They just claim they are “guessing” 
during visual tests. Their phenomenal experience is selectively impaired in the visual 
modality. 
 Different types of neuropsychological syndromes (like amnesia, hemineglect, 
agnosia) that alter or suppress aspects of qualitative experience suggest the existence of 
dissociations within the sensory domain of information processing. As far as we can 
conclude from such neural deficits, each property of a given experience seems to be 
produced by a fixed and specialised neural architecture. These highly selective 
syndromes suggest that phenomenal consciousness is not globally distributed, but 
modular and that its modular properties mirror the organisation of sensory input 
modules.  
 Qualitative aspects of experience originate at the output of sensory modules
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. They 
are and remain separate (we never confuse the redness of an apple with its taste). 
Memory and perception are never experienced as a mixture of indistinct sensations. 
Qualitative experience is also mandatory : you can’t avoid experiencing redness when 
you look at a red screen, seeing a visual array as a three-dimensional objet, or hearing an 
utterance of a sentence (in a language one knows) as a sentence. 
 These modular properties suggest that an adaptive role for phenomenal 
consciousness is to improve the ability to discriminate perceptual and mental states. 
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3. Qualitative labelling of experience 
3.1 Cognitive labelling through phenomenal properties 
One of the most basic and important tasks a living creature has to perform in order to 
eat, move, mate and avoid predation is to extract relevant information from its sensory 
inputs and from its memory. This is what information processing is all about. The task 
is indeed not a trivial one. Biologically relevant information is indirectly defined by 
genes, possibly through learning, though genes can only give a rough indication. This is 
sometimes sufficient. For a frog, any small flying object is a priori edible. For learning 
to take place, however, situations must be distinguished. A frog is unable to learn 
anything about flies, since all flies look the same. With a specialised device for labelling 
experienced situations and a simple feed-back like edible / non-edible, a creature can 
learn a lot about things relevant to food.  
 There are thus two basic labelling functions : (1) evaluation, in order to mark 
situations as positive or negative according to various scales (edible, dangerous, 
attractive, etc.) ; (2) perceptual labelling, which aims at individualising contexts for 
complex representational processing. Our claim is that phenomenal consciousness 
performs both functions, and that this is its main biological purpose, the reason for 
which it has been selected during phylogenetic history. 
 The requirements are different for each label type. Perceptual labels are necessarily 
the result of a highly combinatory device, so that many distinct labels can be generated, 
while a “ value ” label must have a wide dynamic range, so that such labels can be 
accurately compared (the two requirements are not mutually exclusive). Our ability to 
simultaneously experience colour, shape, temperature, weight, sound features, distance 
and so on meets the first requirement. Any combination of all such parameters is likely 
to be unique. On the other hand, our experience of physical pain or pleasure, of sadness 
or joy, of pride, of nostalgia, etc. ranges from slight feeling to extreme intensity, and is 
thus suitable for comparative assessments of situation significance. 
 The perceptual labelling role we give to phenomenal consciousness can be inferred 
from psychological studies on memory source monitoring. Johnson et al. [1988 ; 1993] 
claim that the phenomenal qualitative properties of mental experiences are the very 
source of a more general process of discrimination, judgement and attribution of mental 
events. They suggest that phenomenal properties of experience play a critical role in 
discriminating knowing from remembering, and thus, create a source for one's sense of 
personal past. When memory information without qualitative characteristics is recalled, 
it is experienced as mere knowledge or belief. Hence, phenomenal properties relating to 
perceptual and contextual information appear as important cues for discriminating 
representations, which is essential for assessing the reliability of information. Confusion 
about the nature and the source of different mental representations is likely to be the 
cause of misattribution in the confabulation syndromes where amnesiac patients actually 
mix up the imagined, perceptual and memory representations. 
 From an engineering perspective, a modular labelling system appears to be rather 
odd. Labelling information is indeed a simple task in computer science and data 
transmission. All you have to do is to add unambiguous labels, e.g. as headers, to 
messages. When you receive data on your network navigator or when you open a file 
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with a word processor, objects received or read identify themselves as text, picture, table 
or whatever because they contain heading information giving their type. Labelling on a 
computer is thus easily performed by adding information to information. However, there 
is an obvious difference between computers and neural networks, so obvious that it 
remains implicit and is sometimes overlooked. This difference presumably prevented 
evolution from using headers as labels. To put it crudely, information is never merely 
transmitted in a neural network. Let us briefly clarify this point. 
 By definition, in a digital communication context, a message becomes information 
only when appropriate operations have picked out its features. This definition fits in 
with what we know of sensory analysis in the mammal brain. Take the example of an 
image. When received on a retina, it is a mere matrix of pixels, bearing no information 
in terms of boundaries or outlines. This latter information appears after it has been 
detected by edge detectors. What is transmitted to a further processing level, e.g. an 
object recognition level, is expressed in terms of lines or edges, no longer in terms of 
pixels. In such a processing sequence, information is never transmitted as such, because 
at each stage, the symbol set changes. Things are different on a computer : you may 
mark out a piece of text to indicate the make-up and still have a text, mostly composed 
of the same characters with a few additional marks. In neural networks, this is 
impossible. Any processing changes the nature of information
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. An edge detector is fed 
with pixels, but its output is of a different kind : it indicates the presence or absence of 
an edge with a given orientation at a given location. The engineering solution which 
consists in adding headers to a message in order to identify it unambiguously, as for 
instance in electronic mail, does not work with neural circuitry
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, since such headers 
would be lost at each processing stage. 
 One possibility is to consider that perceptive details have to be forgotten at higher 
levels of a hierarchical cognitive architecture. Detailed features play a role at the first 
stages of recognition, but are of no use afterwards when abstract features are processed. 
C. von der Malsburg [1986] shows in detail why such an organisation is not convincing 
at all, because of its lack of flexibility and parsimony. A purely hierarchical system 
necessitates the existence of dedicated units to represent high-level patterns. But 
whereas the number of combinations that have to be distinguished is virtually infinite, 
the number of such dedicated units in the brain are certainly limited. In other words, a 
purely hierarchical organisation lacks combinatorial power. Also, such dedicated units 
being separate, they cannot be the basis for generalisation : 
When I consider a particular scene, I absorb knowledge about the objects involved, by 
modifying the interactions within and between the corresponding mental symbols. I 
want to be able to have this knowledge at my disposal in other situations if they involve 
partly the same objects or aspects. This, however, is possible only through physical 
overlap between mental symbols. Avoiding this overlap destroys the basis for 
generalization. [von der Malsburg 1986] 
 Von der Malsburg suggests that “mental symbols” are not limited to a given 
hierarchical processing level. What he calls the “natural representation” of an object 
simultaneously involves all its constituent elements. As a consequence, no information 
is lost in the integration process. 
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The symbols of communication [e.g. written words] are mere parsimonious tokens for 
the images they are to evoke in the reader’s mind. In contrast, the symbols of mind 
have to fully represent all aspects of our imaginations.  [von der Malsburg 1986] 
 If we accept this kind of description, phenomenal qualities, which appear at the 
output of modular sensory systems, are available for higher-level processes. In this 
context, the labelling role played by phenomenal consciousness becomes manifest. 
Processes like the justification and the revision of beliefs, especially perceptual beliefs, 
are sensitive to qualitative aspects that are only present at non-conceptual levels. For 
instance, in order for such operations to be accomplished, one should preserve the origin 
(e.g. external vs. internal) of the representations which are poised for use in reasoning 
and in the rational control of speech and action. The perceptual origin of the 
representation seems to be assessed from the abundance of phenomenal details. Kelly 
and Jacoby [1993] argue that the feeling of familiarity arises from attributions based on 
internal cues, such as the ease or relative fluency of perceptual operation, the quality of 
memories and the vividness of visual images. The experience of remembering is not the 
result of some intrinsic qualities of “memory trace”, but rather reflects the operation of a 
decision process that assigns ongoing mental events to particular sources. People 
normally use the presence of perceptual details in a mental state as a cue to infer that 
they are recalling, rather than imagining, and perceiving rather than remembering. 
Phenomenal and qualitative properties accompanying some kinds of mental states, e.g. 
perceptual or proprioceptual states and some episodic memory states, are important cues 
that enable us to ascribe them to ourselves
5,6
. 
 Phenomenal qualities seem thus to strongly interfere with higher-order cognitive 
processes. As a consequence, we are always in hybrid mental states, partly conceptual 
and partly made of contextual qualitative information. The labelling of conceptual 
representations by qualitative properties is only possible if the latter may enter as 
constituents in cognitive representations, as suggested by von der Malsburg. Recent 
advances in brain modelling makes this requirement plausible, as described below. 
3.2 Neural labelling implementation 
With phenomenal consciousness, natural selection seems to have discovered a way of 
labelling inputs which is compatible with neural implementation. But how is it 
implemented ? Edelman [1989] suggests that conscious perception relies on active 
categorisation. He explains that a set of several neural maps is responsible for the 
integrated conscious perception of scenes. This set of maps has been selected among 
other possible combinations of groups of neurones during ontogenesis. Perception itself 
results from the selection of a neural circuit among all possible combinations of 
connections between maps, through a process called reentry, which is a recurrent 
exchange of signals between maps. This is supposed to explain how sensory input 
analysis can be distributed over several locations in the brain and still produce a unified 
perception that is rich enough to be categorised. Thanks to reentry, perception is 
compared with memory traces through an active process that modifies both perception 
and memory. Primary consciousness results from these categorisation processes. 
Edelman, using the same principle, explains how such a unified, conscious, perception 
of a scene is connected to what he calls “values”. Reentry is supposed to occur between 
cortical maps and specific locations in the limbic system that implement values. The 
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latter connection accounts for the evaluation of the perceived situation. Areas 
responsible for evaluation (esp. limbic system, hypothalamus, brain stem) are 
phylogenetically older than those performing categorisation (thalamus and cortex). Both 
systems are necessary for consciousness. 
 This account by Edelman is attractive, but it is far from being fully developed. For 
instance, Edelman’s theory does not help understand why some complex cognitive 
processes are performed unconsciously. Also, Edelman’s description is a purely 
neuronal account. There is no indication of any specific role that qualitative properties 
of experience could play, even if the author claims that consciousness is cognitively 
efficient and increases evolutionary adaptation of individuals. We shall now consider 
another neural account of phenomenal consciousness that may allow us to avoid these 
drawbacks. 
 Our hypothesis is that phenomenal consciousness has an adaptive function which is 
to allow discrimination and labelling of perceptual and mental states. The issue of 
knowing how labelling is achieved is connected to a problem concerning perception 
itself, known as the binding problem. As Damasio puts it : 
It is not enough for the brain to analyze the world into its components parts : the brain 
must bind together those parts that make whole entities and events, both for recognition 
and recall. Consciousness must necessarily be based on the mechanisms that perform 
the binding. [Damasio 1989] 
 In the brain, contrary to what happens in computers, different kinds of processing 
occur in different locations. For instance, colour analysis, shape recognition, movement 
and several other characteristics of visual scenes are detected in separate parts of the 
visual cortex. However, our brain constructs a single and global view of the scene. This 
integration requires a binding mechanism, so that we are able to simultaneously assign 
red colour, direction and form to a single object of the visual scene, that object moving 
toward us over there that we identified as a car. Objects exists as complex 
representations in our mind because we are able to link several phenomenal 
characteristics we could extract from our sensory processing and correlate them together 
as single objects. As we said, qualitative experience is not a general property of our 
mental states and mental processes. We claimed that different aspects of experience 
depend on different sensory modalities. However, qualitative properties experienced in a 
given situation are bound together across modalities and are unified into a single 
representation. 
 Synchronous neural activity, since von der Malsburg [1986] and others, is often 
invoked to account for binding. It has been experimentally observed that neurones 
located in different cortical areas may function synchronously [Singer 1993]. Evidence 
from neurophysiology and from connectionist studies [von der Malsburg & Schneider 
1986] suggested that frequency locking between neurone groups could account for the 
integration of different features of a given perceived situation.  
 Binding through synchronous neural activity is temporary. This explains why its 
combinatory power is virtually infinite. As Singer [1993] puts it, “the essential 
advantage of assembly coding is that individual cells can participate at different times in 
the representation of different objects”. Hence every combination of extracted 
characteristics can be integrated into a single representation and possibly memorised as 
such. This combinatory power is what is needed for a perceptual labelling device. Our 
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suggestion is thus that (1) dynamic feature binding allows labelling of situations ; 
creatures with this ability can cope with much more complex environments ; 
(2) phenomenal consciousness was selected as a way to perform labelling through 
binding. 
 At this point, we have an idea about the kind of adaptive role played by phenomenal 
consciousness. We also have plausible models of the way the labelling function may be 
implemented. We still need accounts for the role phenomenal consciousness played in 
its own evolutionary emergence. Was it directly selected, or is it an evolutionary 
epiphenomenon ? 
4. An evolutionary role for phenomenal consciousness 
4.1 Phenomenal variety and signal discrimination 
The claim that qualitative experience directly contributed to the ability of individuals to 
adapt to their environment during phylogenesis is equivalent to saying that qualitative 
experience is part of the phenotype. In evolutionary systems, we call phenotype the set 
of characteristics which are directly evaluated in the selection process [Dessalles 
1992,1996]. Let us consider an analogy. Ethologists consider bird songs as adaptive : a 
mute song bird would not perform well, being unable to signal its territory properly. The 
ancestors of song birds were selected for their ability to sing. Should we consider that 
singing itself was selected, or rather that the syrinx (bird pharynx) was selected in order 
to allow territory signalling ? Perhaps we should look at the neural processes that are 
involved in singing and say they were also selected for territorial signalling purposes. 
What did selection retain after all, if not the genetic changes that make the difference 
between song birds and their non-singing ancestors ? From genes to neural processes, 
syrinx and song, there is a long chain of embryological events. Each of them is 
necessary for singing to occur. However, when ethologists study song birds, they are 
more prone to consider that the song itself was shaped by evolution to perform territory 
signalling, rather than syrinx or neural states. There are two reasons for this : first, actual 
songs seem to be optimal according to the way “fitness” (here efficient territory 
signalling) is assessed
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 ; second, the fitness of the song can be assessed directly, 
whereas the fitness of syrinx is indirect and we must refer to the singing ability
8
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 For the same reasons, we claim that from an evolutionary perspective we should 
include phenomenal consciousness into the phenotype of conscious beings rather than 
the neural states that underlie qualitative experiences. We indicated how phenomenal 
consciousness, through its labelling ability, could be assigned a fitness value. Now we 
want to show that qualitative properties of experience are, in a sense, optimal for the 
labelling ability. We should however be aware of two difficulties. Bird song can in no 
way be considered as an evolutionary epiphenomenon as phenomenal consciousness 
can. Also, even if song is a more abstract entity than physiological organs, it can be 
objectively measured, whereas qualitative experiences are not accessible : they are 
private to a single, subjective perspective [Nagel 1974]. 
 We assume that phenomenal consciousness is a biological characteristic of living 
species, so we should be able to account for it in terms of natural selection. Any 
observed complex characteristic of living beings which is not a side-effect must have (or 
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have had) an adaptive value
9
. We suggested that phenomenal consciousness is 
associated with an adaptive function, which is to label experience at the output of 
perceptual systems, in such a way that representations do not necessarily become purely 
abstract when they reach central systems. However, we have no direct evidence showing 
that phenomenal consciousness was itself selected to perform this labelling function. 
We still have to discard the possibility that it is an evolutionary epiphenomenon : neural 
processes could have been selected directly to perform the labelling function, and they 
would happen to have phenomenal correlates. The question is thus to know whether 
qualitative experiences are phenotypic or not. Can we assess the optimality of neural 
processes performing labelling without making reference to qualitative experiences ? 
 We want to suggest that there is a “mapping” between the physical input space and 
the qualitative space, and that such a mapping is not predicted by the epiphenomenon 
hypothesis. Consider an example from phonology. The three vowels [a], [i] and [u], 
present in words like apple, see, and fool
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, are basic phonemes present in virtually all 
natural languages [Maddieson 1984]. Being able to distinguish them is thus essential for 
any human being. [a], [i] and [u] look indeed very different to a human ear. This 
qualitative contrasted appearance is consistent with the fact that the discrimination 
performance is maximum for these vocalic phonemes [Lindblom 1986]. It can be shown 
though spectral analysis that these three phonemes are objectively “distant” : by 
measuring basic spectral characteristics called “formants”, acousticians show that [a], 
[i] and [u] are located in opposite corners of the accessible space. These studies by 
acoustic engineers are generally considered as relevant because they establish an 
objective link between our intuition (the three vowels look different) and the 
requirements of robust communication (symbols used for communication should be 
maximally different to be easily distinguished). From another perspective, however, 
such an apparently plausible result should be regarded as quite unlikely. Why should our 
qualitative feeling about the dissimilarity of these phonemes be correlated with 
communication requirements ? If qualitative experience is nothing but an evolutionary 
epiphenomenon, we would expect no such dissimilarity between qualitative states 
corresponding to the perception of [a], [i] and [u].  
 This example reminds us that for some discrimination tasks
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, it seems that we are 
fully aware of all the differences we are able to detect. In other words, in such cases, our 
discriminatory power is entirely due to the grain of qualitative conscious aspects of our 
experience. Our performance relies on the fact that all the qualities we are able to 
experience in a given modality are different and separate. We can take other examples 
involving colour or flavour discrimination. We are aware of all colour shades that we 
can discriminate. This good performance, compared to other mammal species, is due to 
the fact that normal human beings
12
 experience different wavelengths in a contrasted 
way. For instance, colours usually distinguished in English have quite contrasting 
qualitative appearances. We can even assess subjective distances by saying that blue is 
closer to violet than to yellow. Similarly, pineapple taste is not so far from lemon, but 
not at all like tomato. All the stimuli which are biologically relevant and that we 
effortlessly discriminate induce clearly distinct qualitative experiences. This is hard to 
explain if phenomenal consciousness was not involved in the evolutionary process. Why 
aren’t there colours (or tastes or sounds) that we would experience as identical but that 
we would still be able to discriminate ? If phenomenal experience was a mere by-
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product of neural evolution, we could suppose that only neural processes are needed for 
detecting physical information without calling for the corresponding qualitative states. 
 Phenomenal variety, the fact that qualitative experiences in a given modality are 
differentiated, may be given a technical explanation. It is well-known, from an 
engineering perspective, that signal discrimination is easier if signals are spread over a 
wide energy range and compared to maximally distinct patterns
13
. [a], [i] and [u] are 
acoustically the most distinctive vocalic sounds our vocal tract is able to emit. The fact 
that we experience phonemes like [a], [i] and [u] as clearly distinct suggest that 
phenomenal properties are involved in the discrimination process and that they carry 
information. 
 The only possibility which is consistent with phenomenal variety is that qualitative 
experience is not an evolutionary epiphenomenon : it plays a direct role in 
discrimination and as a consequence was selected for its own sake. In other words, we 
perform discriminations on the basis of phenomenal qualities. First conscious species 
were selected according to this ability which requires a rich repertoire of phenomenal 
qualities in each modality. The fact that qualitative experience has a modular structure 
that systematically mirrors the organisation of perceptual systems, and the fact that it 
meets constraints of signal discrimination efficiency by keeping relevant qualitative 
properties scrupulously apart, suggest that phenomenal consciousness was itself 
involved in the evolution process. 
4.2 Selection pressure on qualitative experience 
Our claim is that phenomenal consciousness is optimally designed to perform its 
function, which in our view is to label perceptual and mental states. It is associated with 
the output of each modal sensory processing where it makes relevant signals the most 
discernible. This is exactly what we expect from a perceptual labelling device designed 
by natural selection. If we accept this hypothesis and think that phenomenal 
consciousness has been directly produced by evolution to fulfil an adaptive function, 
then we may consider (1) that phenomenal consciousness is phenotypic and (2) that 
neural states underlying phenomenal states only exist because the latter have an adaptive 
function. In this sense, phenomenal consciousness is part of the phenotype, exactly as 
bird song in our example. Underlying neural devices are not themselves phenotypic, 
since they are just a link in the long chain going from genes to phenomenal 
consciousness. If we follow the analogy with bird song, optimality of qualitative 
experience can be directly understood, whereas the optimality of underlying neural 
states would only appear through a reference to phenomenal properties.  
 From this perspective, phenomenal consciousness is what led the evolution of 
cognitive systems towards increasing discriminatory capacities. If phenomenal qualities 
were epiphenomenal, our perceptions would not give rise to such a variety of 
phenomenal states. The richness and the vividness of our phenomenal repertoire 
suggests that it is the direct product of natural selection. Under this hypothesis, 
qualitative experience has to be seen as a driving element in the evolutionary process 
which produced both our rich perception of the environment and our ability to 
discriminate mental states. It is thus indirectly responsible for our ability to learn 
efficiently. 
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5. Conclusion 
We presented phenomenal consciousness as modular. Qualitative properties of 
experience are associated with sensory modalities, they are and remain distinct even if 
they can be integrated into multimodal and conceptual representations of objects and 
events. According to the hypothesis presented here, an adaptive function of phenomenal 
consciousness is to be found in relation to this integration involving qualitative 
information. Qualitative properties play the role of labels. Through the combinatorial 
power of a binding mechanism based on synchronous firing of neurones, representations 
may be multimodal and yet preserve contextual and modally distinguished perceptual 
aspects. Conscious organisms are thus able to discriminate among their perceptual 
representations. They are neither highly specialised robots nor purely abstract general 
problem solvers. Phenomenal consciousness allow them to better cope with the wide 
range of situations found in a complex ecological environment. 
 Higher-order cognitive processes have to be sensitive to qualitative properties of 
experience in order to determine the source of mental representations. According to our 
hypothesis, this is made possible by the fact that qualitative properties play the role of 
labels that carry information about the origin of representations. 
 The structural features of phenomenal consciousness, its modularity and the variety 
of qualitative properties within each modality, are in accordance with what we expect 
from a labelling device. On the other hand, alternative accounts in terms of neural states 
that consider qualitative properties as epiphenomenal can hardly explain the richness 
and the vividness of the qualitative repertoire. Phenomenal consciousness should be 
considered as a proper phenotypic character. Phenomenal consciousness is what natural 
selection could act upon. Any increase in qualitative variety was likely to induce a more 
probable survival of individuals. This might explain why phenomenal properties of 
experience, which seem to be optimally designed for the labelling of representations, 
were selected and designed by evolution. 
6. Notes 
 
1
 The feeling of being a single entity, the fact that some recalled events look familiar, the feeling of 
“ownership” about our mental states, the first-person point of view, the ability to observe aspects of our 
cognitive functioning are other important features of what is called consciousness. Nevertheless, all of 
them are different aspects of consciousness, each one might be related to different cognitive functions and 
may eventually call for different accounts [Zalla 1996]. 
2
 In the modular theory of consciousness put forward by R. Jackendoff [1987], only the intermediate level, 
where sensory information has been processed in a modality specific way but has not yet reached central 
representations, supports awareness. 
3
 The reader may object that topological information is transmitted as such, from map to map, in neural 
visual processing. But what is conveyed here is signal, not information. Neighbouring relations are present 
in the matrix for an external observer, but they do not exist as such for the brain until they are detected. 
And they are lost afterwards. An edge detector may use topology among pixels. At the output of this 
detector, topological relationships between pixels do not exist anymore, simply because at this stage 
pixels are no longer represented. Topology among edges is preserved in the signal, only because it has not 
yet been detected. 
4
 We speak here of biological plausible circuitry as we imagine it, since it is technically possible to 
perform anything with neurones, even compute square roots. 
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5
 Suengas and Johnson's experiments [1988, p.388] also demonstrated that both emotion when recalling 
imaginary events and lack of clarity when recalling real events reduce qualitative differences between 
these two types of memories and thus tend to generate some kind of confabulation.  
6
 A syndrome associated with deep lesions in the right posterior, non-linguistic hemisphere is 
characterised by the patient's denial of “ownership” of his paralysed, left arm. Conversely, normal subjects 
experience the loss of a limb very much as a loss of “a part of themselves”. We can suppose that the lack 
of proprioceptual qualitative states is the cause of one’s misattribution of parts of the body. 
7
 For instance, characteristics of bird songs produced by different neighbouring species are very different. 
The male bird can thus be correctly identified by females of its species. 
8
 By contrast, a physiologist would not be interested in territory signalling. She would consider syrinx as 
phenotypic and the ability to produce a distinctive song as a way to assess syrinx fitness.  
9
 Strictly speaking, the adaptive value should be assessed at the gene level [Dawkins 1978]. Neutralists 
[Kimura 1983] have claimed that random shifts are an important aspect to explain evolution ; however the 
probability that complex functional characteristics emerge from random shift is virtually zero. 
10
 In French, these phonemes are present in words like plat, vie, roue. In English, apple starts with [æ]. 
Better examples for [a] would be words like lie and now in which the first part of the diphthong is 
considered. 
11
 According to the modular description that we adopted, this happens at a certain level of input analysis, 
at the output of sensory modules. 
12
 Colour blind subjects being of course excluded. 
13
 In digital communications, possible waveforms should be chosen so that the energy of their difference is 
maximal. 
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